Toward a More  Courageous Politics  at the 60th Anniversary of the UDHR: Talking About Muslim Fundamentalism in the West by Bennoune, Karima
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 14
Toward a More "Courageous Politics" at the 60th
Anniversary of the UDHR: Talking About Muslim
Fundamentalism in the West
Karima Bennoune
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karima Bennoune, Toward a More "Courageous Politics" at the 60th Anniversary of the UDHR: Talking About Muslim Fundamentalism in
the West, 24 Md. J. Int'l L. 125 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol24/iss1/14
12 BENNOUNE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009 12:51 PM 
 
 
125 
Toward a More ―Courageous Politics‖ at the 
60th Anniversary of the UDHR: Talking 
About Muslim Fundamentalism in the West 
KARIMA BENNOUNE  
 
I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to take part in 
this celebration of the 60
th
 anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).1  The UDHR starts with the idea that the 
same principles are meant to govern the rights of all human beings, 
regardless of differences in gender, race, sexual orientation, 
geographic location, religion, ethnicity, politics, social class, or other 
status.  Human beings qualify for human rights simply by being 
human, wherever they live and whoever they are.  Of course, in 
practice we know this is a classic legal fiction.  People’s particu-
larities often have a grave impact on their level of actually enjoying 
human rights.  But, it is a legal fiction worth fighting for, worth 
working to make a non-fiction.  Universality can be a progressive and 
unifying idea in our times of polarization.  
Of course, we still have to figure out what universality can, and 
should, mean in the face of what are called in the title of this panel, 
―the claims of culture and religion.‖  In my view, it is entirely 
appropriate to carefully analyze the meanings and application of 
 
 Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School, and Professor of Law and Arthur 
L. Dickson Scholar at Rutgers School of Law, Newark, N.J.  
1. For further elaboration of the themes raised here, see Karima Bennoune, Secularism 
and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and 
Women‟s Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367 (2007); 
Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 50–60 (2008); and Karima 
Bennoune, „The Law of the Republic Versus the Law of the Brothers‟: A Story of France‟s 
Law Banning Religious Symbols in Public Schools, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 
155, 155–190 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2008).  
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universal human rights in a contextual manner, taking into con-
sideration the specificities and politics of local context, and paying 
heed to the range of local rights advocates and to diverse claims of 
culture, religion, and other particulars.  This is perhaps a pluralism 
within a universal approach.  I am sensitive to the warning of the 
ethicist Jean Elshtain that ―nothing less than the sin of hubris is 
implicated in any attempt to weld humanity into a single 
monoculture.‖2  That is not the sort of universality I have in mind. 
However, some critique universality as being a Western construct 
that is inappropriate elsewhere.  I disagree.  As a ―third culture kid,‖ I 
have been fortunate to live in vastly different cultures during my life 
and to travel around the world in my human rights career.  I have 
found the universal in many locales, though it may have a different 
face in different contexts.  Some of its most ardent defenders, and 
those who have risked the most to defend and define it, are located 
outside of the West, many in what is called the Muslim world.  I have 
seen such defense of universality, for example, in the commitment of 
Afghan women human rights workers I met at the Coordinating 
Center for Afghanistan who organized teams to go door-to-door and 
conduct surveys about people who had gone missing in the armed 
conflict between mujahideen groups in the 1990s.  Despite pressure 
from fundamentalist armed groups and claims made in the name of 
―tradition‖ that any missing women would be considered ―fallen,‖ 
these workers were determined to include cases of ―disappeared‖ 
women in the report they produced, and risked their lives to do so. 
This example reminds us how claims made in the name of culture 
and religion and tradition against the application of universal human 
rights have been hijacked in the service of a range of political ends in 
recent years—and thus we always need to unpack such claims 
carefully.  In my own work on the human rights impact of Muslim 
fundamentalism on Muslim populations, I have confronted this 
problem repeatedly―and this set of issues is what I will address in 
this essay.   
First, what does the term ―fundamentalism‖ mean?  I do not have 
time to answer this comprehensively now but I will say a few words 
about this word.  Marieme Hélie-Lucas, an Algerian sociologist who 
founded the network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws, has 
 
2. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Third Annual Grotius Lecture: Just War and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
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defined fundamentalisms (note the ―s‖) as ―political movements of 
the extreme right, which, in a context of globalization . . . manipulate 
religion . . . in order to achieve their political aims.‖3  Though not 
without its own set of difficulties, the importance of the terminology 
of fundamentalisms is that it speaks across religious boundaries about 
movements within many traditions,4 including Christian, Hindu, and 
Jewish, that today pose major human rights challenges.   
In Muslim contexts, fundamentalist movements have proliferated 
and grown in recent years, especially since the late 1970s.  They are a 
diverse set of groupings, including everything from NGOs to political 
organizations to armed groups (and their sympathizers), located both 
in the region and in the Diasporas.  They pose particular threats to the 
human rights of freethinkers, women, religious and sexual minorities, 
and to notions of the universality of human rights.  There is no space 
here to offer a comprehensive overview of these movements or their 
impact on human rights.  However I would refer those who are 
interested to the excellent typology that was prepared by the U.K. 
South Asian network Awaaz, entitled ―The Islamic Right: Key 
Tendencies.‖5   
Collectively, fundamentalist movements in a range of religious 
traditions have shifted the discourse of governments, the media, 
populations, and even human rights advocates—locally, regionally, 
and internationally—on many key subjects in a generation or two.  
The claims they have made in the name of religion and culture have 
transmogrified the ways we talk about many subjects related to this 
panel: human rights, the rights of women, dress codes, identity, 
reproductive rights, secularism, the meaning of religion, and univer-
 
3. Marieme Hélie-Lucas, What Is Your Tribe?  Women‟s Struggles and the Construction 
of Muslimness, 26 DOSSIER 24, 25 (2004), available at http://www.wluml.org/english/ 
publications.shtml (follow ―Dossier‖ hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).  Scottish 
sociologist Steve Bruce has written that ―fundamentalisms rest on the claim that some source 
of ideas, usually a text, is inerrant and complete. . . . [F]undamentalists also claim the 
existence of some perfect social embodiment of the true religion of the past.‖  STEVE BRUCE, 
FUNDAMENTALISM 13–14 (2000). 
4. See generally FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby 
eds., 1991); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF RADICAL 
RELIGION, OIL AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006); CHETAN BHATT, 
LIBERATION AND PURITY: RACE, NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND THE ETHICS OF 
POSTMODERNITY 77–107 (1997). 
5. For a useful typology of Muslim fundamentalist groups, see The Islamic Right – Key 
Tendencies (Awaaz – South Asia Watch), June 2006, available at http://www.awaazsaw.org/ 
awaaz_pia4.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
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sality itself.  The power of fundamentalisms is undeniable, yet in the 
international human rights world we often overlook these social 
movements altogether.  These movements and their adherents claim 
to speak for, and in the name of, culture, religion, and tradition.  In 
the era of the ―war on terror,‖ such claims made in Muslim contexts 
are often accepted at face value by well-meaning Western liberals 
and human rights advocates—though these claims are almost all 
heavily contested within Muslim populations, often, though not 
always, on the grounds of universality of human rights. 
There is no question that religious and cultural claims of par-
ticularity raise a range of significant methodological, moral, and 
political questions as we try to apply universal human rights norms.  
However, I think we must avoid the bizarre privileging and freezing 
of what is meant by culture and religion so often in these debates.6  
There are many questions we need to ask.  Why is it that what are 
called cultural claims are privileged over other sorts of claims, like 
political claims or claims for gender equality, with what are labeled 
religious claims frequently put right at the top of the hierarchy?  Why 
do only some peoples seem to have culture?  Why are only certain 
kinds of culture visible?  One example is the way in which main-
stream U.S. human rights discourse frames the debate over 
headscarves in French schools.  Why does what is called ―Muslim 
culture‖—meaning Iranian scarves worn by, or imposed by funda-
mentalists upon, the daughters of North African immigrants—take 
center stage while French secularism to which many in France’s 
Muslim population also adhere and which is based on hundreds of 
years of tradition and struggle against the power of the Catholic 
Church is not seen as culture?   
When thinking about the weight to be accorded by human rights 
law to what are termed ―the claims of culture and religion,‖ and as we 
speak in the West about human rights in Muslim countries or 
populations, we need to be careful of opposing the problematic 
 
6. For more discussion of these debates, see the cyber-colloquy between Peter Danchin 
and this author generated by Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a 
Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2008), which was 
commissioned by the editors of the Yale Journal of International Law.  Karima Bennoune, 
Response to Peter Danchin‟s “Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious 
Freedom in International Law,” OPINIO JURIS, June 9, 2008, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/06/ 
09; Peter Danchin, Whose Rights?  Which Equality?  A Reply to Professor Bennoune, OPINIO 
JURIS, June 9, 2008, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/06/09. 
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paradigm of the ―clash of civilizations‖ with our own human rights 
version of this construct.  Of course, the human rights version rejects 
the pejorative connotations of Samuel Huntington’s thesis7—at least 
the most obvious ones—but it is actually often simply an inverted 
version of his paradigm, based similarly on a notion of immutable, 
absolute, unvarying, unchallenged difference.  Fundamentalist-
inspired claims in the name of culture and religion are sometimes 
seen as more tantalizingly authentic and more fashionably ―different‖ 
in the Western human rights legal academy than claims inspired by 
universality emanating from within Muslim populations.   
There are many ways of dividing the world, each of which alters 
how we understand it and shifts our view of claims made in the name 
of culture and religion.  As a group of dissident intellectuals of 
Muslim heritage, including Salman Rushdie, wrote in 2006 in 
response to the controversy regarding Danish cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohamed:8 ―It is not a clash of civilisations nor an antagonism 
between West and East that we are witnessing, but a global struggle 
that confronts democrats and theocrats.‖9  Of course, they, too, were 
generalizing, but theirs is perhaps a generalization that may help us to 
see some of ours in a different light and to remember that there is a 
multiplicity of fault lines in the world.  The clashes and claims within 
civilizations and cultures and religions are as determinative as the 
clashes between them.  As we consider ―the claims of culture and 
religion,‖ to what space then do we relegate contestation within 
civilizations or the many voices that emanate from, or struggle to be 
heard within each of them, or the proponents of universality in these 
diverse contexts?  To whose claims of culture and religion will we 
defer when such deference implicates the enjoyment of universal 
human rights by others—most often by women, who are seen to be 
culture incarnate?  
My work has taught me time and again that, as is true for all 
religious or cultural groups, there are many ways of being Muslim—
or choosing not to be—all of which are equally authentic.  This 
 
7. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD 
ORDER (1997). 
8. For a definitive description and analysis of the cartoon controversy, see JEANNE 
FAVRET-SAADA, COMMENT PRODUIRE UNE CRISE MONDIALE AVEC DOUZE PETITS DESSINS 
(2007). 
9. Writers Issue Cartoon Row Warning, BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/europe/4763520.stm. 
12 BENNOUNE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  12:51 PM 
130 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:125 
reality is reflected in the lyrical prose of the Saudi writer Rajaa 
Alsanea.  In her recent novel, ―Girls of Riyadh,‖ which was a 
sensation in the Arab World, she recounts the travails of four young 
Saudi women.10  (Time Magazine described the book as ―Sex in the 
City, if the city in question were Riyadh.‖)11  Frustrated by criticism 
she has received, Alsanea’s narrator e-mails the following rejoinder 
to her fictional Yahoo! Group’s subscribers: 
The Qu’ran verses, hadith of the Prophet – peace be upon him 
– and religious quotations that I include in my e-mails are, to 
me, inspirational and enlightening.  And so are the poems and 
love songs that I include.  Are these things opposite to each 
other, and so is that a contradiction?  I don’t think so.  Am I 
not a real Muslim because I don’t devote myself to reading 
only religious books and because I don’t shut my ears to music 
and I don’t consider anything romantic to be rubbish?  I am 
religious, a balanced Saudi Muslim and I can say that there are 
a lot of people just like me.  My only difference is that I don’t 
conceal what others would call contradictions within myself or 
pretend perfection like some do.  We all have our spiritual 
sides as well as our not-so-spiritual sides.12   
In a similar pluralist vein, the progressive anti-fundamentalist 
network in France known as Le Manifeste des Libertés, a group of 
Muslim/North African/Middle Eastern activists and intellectuals who 
came together around an erudite manifesto in 2004, found a nice, 
open formula to describe this multiplicity when they painted them-
selves as a diverse group ―linked by our own individual histories, and 
in different ways, to Islam (liés par nos histories singulières, et de 
différentes manières, à l‟Islam).‖13  While I concede the need to 
strategically essentialize in order to talk about virtually anything, too 
much essentializing, even in the quest to recognize what we call 
―difference‖ in human rights, conceals the very vital heterogeneity 
that Le Manifeste des Libertés and Alsanea’s narrator both tried so 
carefully to reflect. 
 
10. RAJAA ALSANEA, GIRLS OF RIYADH (Rajaa Alsanea & Marilyn Booth trans., Penguin 
Press 2007) (2005). 
11. Richard Corliss et al., Downtime, TIME, July 16, 2007, at 69. 
12. ALSANEA, supra note 10, at 137. 
13. Manifeste des Libertés, Texte de Fondation de l’Association du Manifeste des 
Libertés, Dec. 17, 2004, http://www.manifeste.org/article.php3?id_article=113 (translation 
by author). 
12 BENNOUNE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  12:51 PM 
2009] TALKING ABOUT MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISMS 131 
There is no question that finding the right balance for addressing 
the issue of Muslim fundamentalism in the U.S. in the contemporary 
moment is incredibly difficult and requires one to tightrope walk over 
perilous waters, making use of a vocabulary heavily laden with 
unfortunate political meaning.  One must somehow find a space for a 
human rights-based critique of both fundamentalism and racism, both 
the Islamic right and the Western right—but after all, that is what a 
vigorous and principled universality should be about.  This requires a 
rigorous unpacking of language and a thick analysis of human rights.  
In today’s world, it is perhaps convenient for those seeking to take 
―critical‖ perspectives to adopt a narrow position based on claims of 
religious freedom or anti-racism, only looking at these questions 
through particular human rights lenses.  However, in my view that 
does not reflect the actual complexities of what is at stake here.   
The impulse to be consciously non-discriminatory in one’s 
approach to the issue of Muslim fundamentalism is understandable 
and important.  Some Western responses to these Muslim funda-
mentalist groups suffer from what B.S. Chimni has called a kind of 
hegemonic construct of human dignity.14  Some use their critique of 
Muslim fundamentalist violence and ideology as a springboard for 
racist discourses about Muslims, or as a justification for human rights 
violations, like torture.  Such an approach to Muslim fundamentalism 
narrows the space for legitimate human rights-based critiques of 
these movements.  And in the U.S., we were reminded every day 
during the 2008 presidential campaign that we live in a terribly racist 
environment where ―Arab‖ and ―Muslim‖ are epithets to be hurled at 
politicians one does not ―trust.‖ 
Thus, one certainly wants to counter events like ―Islamo-fascism 
Awareness Week,‖ organized on U.S. college campuses in October 
2007 by conservative activist David Horowitz, at which the subject of 
the critique slipped easily and mistakenly from fundamentalist 
terrorists to ―Islam‖ writ large.15  However, to critique such an event 
 
14. B. S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 120 (1993).  For an example of this sort of flawed critique of 
Muslim fundamentalism, see Ruth Wedgwood, Countering Catastrophic Terrorism: An 
American View, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 103 
(Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004). 
15. For a description of this event by its protagonists, see Terrorism Awareness Project, 
Islamo-Facism Awareness Week, http://www.terrorismawareness.org/islamo-fascism-aware 
ness-week.  For criticism of this event, see Ali Eteraz, Laughing at “Islamo-Fascism 
Awareness Week,” HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-
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should not necessarily lead us to deny that there are some Muslim 
fundamentalist armed groups that could be labeled fascist in their 
ideology and indeed are sometimes so labeled in the Arabic language 
press.16  Unfortunately, the absence of a systematic and principled 
human rights-based critique of these movements in Western 
scholarship and human rights narratives has left the terrain vacant, to 
be filled instead by highly problematic discourses like those 
associated with Islamo-fascism Awareness Week.  In fact, the failure 
of learned U.S. discourse—including in the field of human rights—to 
name and thoughtfully explain the problem of Muslim funda-
mentalism has facilitated discrimination against Muslims in general 
because people simply do not understand that terrorism and the ―war 
on terror‖ are about a very specific set of politics and political actors, 
not about religion or religious claims. 
I have found a common theme in the words of many of the 
progressive anti-fundamentalist North Africans whom I have 
interviewed—academics and activists alike.  They have regularly 
expressed frustration with some Western academics and human rights 
advocates whom they feel do not acknowledge or support them or 
even listen to their voices raised in opposition to Muslim fun-
damentalist movements.  This is particularly demoralizing to my 
interlocutors, as they see themselves as the logical counterparts of 
these same human rights voices in the West.17   
As Chetan Bhatt has noted in the context of the United Kingdom, 
―[g]enerally . . . black and multiracial feminism has been virtually 
 
eteraz/laughing-at-islamofasci_b_67565.html. 
16. This is a word with powerful historical connotations.  Nevertheless, critics of such 
movements from within the Muslim world have been using this term to describe extremist 
movements.  For example, in the wake of the London bombings, the Arabic-language 
international media, like Asahrq al Awsat and the website Elaph, published articles by Arab 
writers about ―Islamic fascism.‖  See Un Fascisme Musulman?  Un Tabou Est Tombé, 
COURRIER INT’L, July 13–20, 2005, at 12.  Note that some other ardent critics of Muslim 
fundamentalist movements have disputed the utility or accuracy of the application of this 
term.  See, e.g., Fred Halliday, The Left and the Jihad, OPENDEMOCRACY, Sept. 7, 2006, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/left_jihad_3886.jsp. 
17. For further elaboration of this key point, see Statement from Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws to the World Social Forum, Appeal Against Fundamentalisms (Jan. 21, 2005), 
http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[157]=x-157-103376 (last visited Mar. 
26, 2009).  See also Marieme Hélie-Lucas, The Enemy of My Enemy Is Not My Friend: 
Fundamentalist Non State Actors, Democracy and Human Rights, WOMEN LIVING UNDER 
MUSLIM LAWS, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd 
[157]=x-157-544539 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
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alone in creating an activist political challenge to fundamentalism.‖18  
Universality reminds us to recognize and reflect on this challenge.  
To do so is not Islamophobic.  It is imperative to find thoughtful 
ways to engage with and depict those who are working demo-
cratically to expose and oppose Muslim fundamentalism within 
Muslim countries and diaspora populations, especially those whose 
human rights have been imperiled as a result.  Their endeavors 
collectively represent one of the most important and ignored human 
rights struggles of our time, one that is clearly true to the principles of 
the UDHR. 
One example of such an advocate is Cherifa Kheddar, the president 
of Djazairouna, an association of Algerian victims of Islamist 
terrorism.  Ms. Kheddar’s brother and sister were both murdered by 
Algeria’s fundamentalist armed groups during the terrible 1990s.19  
Since then, Ms. Kheddar has worked tirelessly, in one of the most 
dangerous parts of Algeria, to support victims of terrorism—and 
demand justice for them.  In addition to the ongoing threat posed to 
people like Ms. Kheddar by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which 
seeks to rekindle the horrors of the 1990s conflict in Algeria,20 she 
has also been penalized by the Algerian government for her 
opposition to an amnesty given to both non-state and government 
perpetrators (again a reflection of her commitment to universality).  
She was demoted in her government job and may lose her 
government housing, which is a very difficult sanction in Algeria’s 
impossible housing situation.21 
The real struggle against terrorism—as opposed to the flawed ―war 
on terror‖ that has so challenged universal human rights—is a human 
rights struggle, carried out in part by people like Ms. Kheddar with 
their voices and pens and organizing efforts.  The only way such 
efforts can succeed is with sustained and thoughtful support that is 
based on an analysis that critiques both governments and their 
fundamentalist opponents.  The only way we can truly understand the 
 
18.  BHATT, supra note 4, at xx. 
19. See Craig S. Smith, Many Algerians Are Not Reconciled by Amnesty Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A3. 
20. For more on the situation in Algeria in the 1990s, see Karima Bennoune, S.O.S. 
Algeria: Women‟s Human Rights Under Siege, in FAITH AND FREEDOM: WOMEN’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, 184 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 1995). 
21. For more information, see Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture, Licenciement 
Abusif de Mme Cherifa Kheddar, May 22, 2008, http://www.omct.org/index.php?articleId= 
7805 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
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complexities of mediating what are named the claims of culture and 
religion on universal human rights today is by paying attention to 
people like these who force us to complicate not only our narratives, 
but also our counter-narratives.  As Cherifa Kheddar said in Paris on 
September 11, 2007, at the International Conference against 
Terrorism, ―neither the cowardice of institutions, nor their simple 
condemnations of terrorist acts, will end fundamentalist violence, in 
the absence of a courageous politics, both at the regional and 
international levels.‖22 
The ―courageous politics‖ needed to deal with this grave set of 
challenges to the very framework of the UDHR will require 
international human rights lawyers to develop what Gita Sahgal has 
called a ―human rights account‖23 of fundamentalisms—both in 
Muslim contexts that I have discussed here, and in the many other 
contexts in which fundamentalisms arise.  This human rights account 
of fundamentalisms is a vital part of renewing our commitment at this 
60
th
 anniversary to making real the UDHR’s dream of the ―equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family.‖24 
 
 
22. Cherifa Kheddar, Dir., Djazairouna Ass’n of the Families of Victims of Terrorism, 
Oui, C’est Cette Terreur que Nous Avons Vécue Seuls et Isolés: Le Témoignage Accablant 
de Cherifa Kheddar, Address Before the International Conference Against Terrorism (Sept. 
11, 2007) (translation by author) (on file with author). 
23. Gita Sahgal, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Confronting Terrorism as a 
Human Rights Issue, Speech Before the Amnesty Int’l USA Mtg. Pub. Roundtable (Feb. 16, 
2007) (on file with author). 
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
